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A Farewell to Arms: Risk/Benefit Litigation
Against Gun Manufacturers in California
After the Repeal of Statutory Immunity
Martin Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the California Legislature, in an attempt to ward off
impending litigation against gun manufacturers for damages aris-
ing from criminal misuse of their products, enacted Civil Code
Section 1714.4.1 The statute granted gun manufacturers immu-
nity from product liability suits based on an imbalance of risk over
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2003, Chapman University School of Law. The au-
thor would like to thank David Linneman for his expert help with the synthesis of statisti-
cal data, Professor Katherine Baird Darmer for her knowledgeable advice, and Shannon
Johnson for her encouragement and inspiration. This comment is dedicated to victims of
gun violence and to all who have fought to prevent gun violence.
1 The Statute states:
Products liability actions; Firearm or ammunition not to be deemed defective in
design on basis that benefits not outweighed by risk
(a) In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defec-
tive in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk
of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when
discharged.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) The potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, damage,
or death when discharged does not make the product defective in design.
(2) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or ammuni-
tion are not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious injury, dam-
age, or death, but are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the
product.
(c) This section shall not affect a products liability cause of action based upon the
improper selection of design alternatives.
(d) This section is declaratory of existing law.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714.4 (Deering 1994) (repealed 2002).
The Senate analysis described the bill's "purpose" as follows: (1) "to protect manu-
facturers and sellers of firearms from being held liable in tort for selling or fur-
nishing a firearm that was used to cause an injury or death"; (2) "to preclude
courts from using products liability theories to hold firearm manufacturers and
dealers civilly liable to victims of firearms usage"; (3) "to prevent the courts from
extending products liability laws to hold a supplier of a firearm liable in tort to
persons injured by use of the weapon"; and (3) [sic] "to 'stop at birth' the notion
that manufacturers and dealers are liable in products liability to victims of hand-
gun usage."
See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 127 (Cal. 2001) (citing Analysis of Assembly Bill
No. 75 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1983-1984 Reg. Sess. 2-3, 7).
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benefits, but expressly permitted suits based on improper selec-
tion of design alternatives.2
Section 1714.4 proved effective in holding off an onslaught of
suits3 and protecting the businesses that had lobbied for its pas-
sage.4 Most recently, in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.5-the third and
last case to reach the appellate level, and the only one to reach the
California Supreme Court since the statute's enactment-the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the Section 1714.4 not only pro-
hibited strict product liability suits, but also prohibited actions
based on a negligence theory, such as negligent distribution or
marketing, on the basis that these actions necessarily relied on a
risk/benefit analysis and thus fell within the statutory bar.
In September 2002, in direct response to the Merrill decision,
Section 1714.4 was repealed.7 This comment predicts that the im-
minent flood of lawsuits against gun manufacturers in California
in the wake of repeal will likely be successful, despite the consis-
tent reluctance of courts in jurisdictions without immunity stat-
utes to impose liability based on risks outweighing benefits (or on
any other theory).8 This prediction is founded on the current state
2 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4 (Deering 1994) (repealed 2002).
3 See, e.g., Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff's
claim that the defendant's gun was "defectively designed because it [was] small, easily con-
cealable, relatively inexpensive, and serves no useful social purpose" was rejected on the
grounds that both Section 1714.4 and California common law precluded the imposition of
strict product liability for a product that performed as it was intended. Id. at 1327. See
also Whitfield v. Heckler & Koch, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 820, 830 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that "the Legislature intended to preclude both courts and juries from engaging in any type
of risk-benefit analysis when it comes to the design of firearms or ammunition").
4 From 1974 until 1983, annual handgun sales in California averaged 270,014 units.
Between 1984 and 2001, annual sales averaged 280,959 units. Dealer's Record of Sale
(Calendar Year Statistics), Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Department
of Justice, available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2002/02-024.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2003) [hereinafter Dealer's Record of Sale].
5 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
6 Id. at 127.
7 S.B. 682, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). The bill also added language to Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 1714 (dealing with negligence, generally) to expressly permit negli-
gence actions against gun manufacturers: "The design, distribution, or marketing of
firearms and ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is
required by this section." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering Supp. 2003). See Jenifer War-
ren & Dan Morain, Davis Signs More Curbs on Gun Makers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002,
Cal. Metro, at B8.
Recently proposed federal legislation, however, may effectively reinstate statutory im-
munity for gun manufacturers in California. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003). The proposed
legislation, introduced primarily in response to municipal nuisance suits against gun man-
ufacturers, provides a similar breadth of immunity to that previously provided by Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 1714.4. A significant difference is the inclusion of language
expressly permitting negligent entrustment actions wherein "the seller knows or should
know the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to use the product, and in fact
does use the product, in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the
person and others." Id. § 4(5)(B). See also John Tierney, A New Push to Grant Gun Indus-
try Immunity from Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at A12.
8 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997); Keene v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
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of California product liability law, the apparent intent behind the
enactment and repeal of Section 1714.4, and the comparative
weight of risk and benefit evidence. In conclusion, this comment
argues that the ability of juries to severely restrict the right of gun
manufacturers to pursue a legal trade is not only compelled by
law, but also morally justified in that the cost to society at large
resulting from distribution of guns should be borne exclusively by
those transacting in guns.
II. GUN MANUFACTURER SUITS IN CALIFORNIA AFTER MERRILL V.
NAVEGAR, INC. AND THE REPEAL OF SECTION 1714.4
A. The Claim Rejected in the Merrill Opinion
In Merrill, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a plaintiff could sue a gun manufacturer for injuries
sustained as a result of criminal misuse of its product.9 The Mer-
rill plaintiffs' claim was presented as one of "negligent distribu-
tion," i.e., that the defendant knew, or should have known, that
selling its product-a semi-automatic "assault-type" pistoll°-to
the general public would likely result in harmful criminal mis-
use.'1 The Supreme Court held that this claim was directed at the
inherent qualities of the product, and that because an assessment
of risk versus benefit is essential to the determination of a duty in
negligence, the claim was really a product liability design defect
action of the type expressly barred by Section 1714.4.12 Thus the
Court disposed of the negligence claim as falling within the scope
of the statute, and did not directly address the possible viability of
the claim absent a statutory bar.
770 A.2d 1072, 1091-92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), cert. granted, 778 A.2d 382 (Md. 2001),
aff'd, 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (App. Div. 1996).
9 28 P.3d 116, 126 (Cal. 2001). The plaintiffs were relatives of victims of a shooting
rampage by Gian Luigi Ferri that occurred in an office building in San Francisco. Ferri
was armed with an Intratec TEC-9 (manufactured by Navegar) that he had purchased at a
pawnshop in Nevada. While legally available in Nevada, the TEC-9 was not legally availa-
ble for sale in California at that time. Id. at 119-20, 126.
lo An "assault weapon" is defined by federal statute as:
(C) a semiautomatic pistol that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and
has at least 2 of [the following characteristics]-
(i) an ammunition magazine that attaches to the pistol outside of the pistol
grip;
(ii) a threaded barrel capable of accepting a barrel extender, flash suppressor,
forward handgrip, or
silencer;
(iii) a shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the bar-
rel and that permits the
shooter to hold the firearm with the nontrigger hand without being burned;
(iv) a manufactured weight of 50 ounces or more when the pistol is unloaded
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C) (2000 & Supp. 2003). The statute's definition also encompasses
any one of a number of listed models including the Intratec TEC-9 and TEC-DC9.
ii Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124 (Cal. 2001).
12 Id. at 129-30.
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B. Other Jurisdictions' Rejection of Gun Manufacturer Suits
In light of other jurisdictions' decisions, it appears that even
after the removal of the statutory immunity granted by Section
1714.4, there are significant obstacles facing plaintiffs who seek
redress from gun manufacturers. Courts outside California have
rejected lawsuits against gun manufacturers on the following ba-
ses: a gun (or ammunition) is not defective if it performs as in-
tended,13 the market assumes the risk of misuse of a known
dangerous product,14 gun manufacturers cannot be held liable in
negligence as long as the product is legally available and functions
as intended, 15 and the weighing of risks against benefits of guns is
a task for the legislature, not the courts. 6
The highest court of only one state has held a gun manufac-
turer liable for criminal misuse of its product." Acknowledging
contrary precedent, the Maryland Court of Appeals held, as a mat-
ter of public policy, that manufacturers of "Saturday Night Spe-
cials""8 could be held strictly liable for criminal misuse of their
product.19 The Maryland ruling was short-lived, as it was over-
ruled by statute only three years later,'° and it seems to have had
little impact on out-of-state sales, despite the potential under Ma-
13 Keene, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67 (finding no risk/benefit test in Texas); Halliday
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 770 A.2d 1072, 1087-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), cert. granted,
778 A.2d 382 (Md. 2001), affd, 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002) (holding no defect under either
consumer expectation or risk/benefit theory when there is no malfunction).
14 Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)) (hold-
ing that there can be no liability for gun manufacturers when the general public "presuma-
bly can recognize the dangerous consequences in the use of handguns and can assume
responsibility for their actions").
15 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997). The court held that "New
York does not impose a duty upon a manufacturer to refrain from the lawful distribution of
a non-defective product" despite foreseeabilty by manufacturer of misuse. Id. (quoting
Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1996)).
16 Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (App. Div. 1996) ("While there have been
and will be countless debates over the issue of whether the risks of firearms outweigh their
benefits, it is for Legislature to decide whether manufacture, sale and possession of fire-
arms is legal.").
17 Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
18 The Maryland Court of Appeals described 'Saturday Night Specials" as "character-
ized by short barrels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap quality mater-
ials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliability ... render[ing] the Saturday Night
Special particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless for . . . legitimate
purposes." Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
19 Id. at 1159.
20 The Maryland statute states:
A person or entity may not be held strictly liable for damages of any kind resulting
from injuries to another person sustained as the result of the criminal use of any
firearm by a third person, unless the person or entity conspired with the third
person to commit, or willfully aided, abetted, or caused the commission of the crim-
inal act in which the firearm was used.
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27 § 36-I(h)(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2002).
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ryland's long-arm statute21 for suits arising from shootings in the
state involving guns manufactured or sold in other states.
C. The Continued Relevance of the Merrill Holding
Although negligence and strict product liability suits against
gun manufacturers have been largely unsuccessful outside Cali-
fornia,22 this does not necessarily mean that California state
courts will now follow other jurisdictions and reject claims based
on risk/benefit. There may be compelling reasons why California
should allow such claims. Before dismissing Merrill as "bad law"
overruled by the repeal of Section 1714.4, one should examine
some of the language in the holding of that case. Writing for the
majority, Justice Chin stated:
[T]he availability of [risk/benefit based] negligence liability
would effectively render Section 1714.4 useless. As the Court of
Appeal majority observed, "the risk of harm from the criminal
misuse of firearms is always present in a society such as ours, in
which the presence of firearms is fairly widespread and many
individuals possess the capacity to criminally misuse them."
Thus, virtually every person suing for injuries from firearm use
could offer evidence the manufacturer knew or should have
known the risk of making its firearm available to the public out-
weighed the benefits of that conduct, and could therefore raise a
triable issue of fact for the jury. In each of these cases, the jury
would be asked to do precisely what section 1714.4 prohibits:
weigh the risks and benefits of a particular firearm. The result
would be to resurrect the very type of lawsuit the Legislature
passed section 1714.4 to foreclose, in which the plaintiffs "as-
serted that the availability of 'Saturday Night Special' hand-
guns to the general public cause[d] widespread damage and
severe harm without conferring any substantial social
benefit."23
The above passage strongly suggests that without Section
1714.4, California courts would be compelled to entertain risk/
benefit lawsuits against gun manufacturers. The following lan-
guage from the Merrill opinion further strengthens the implica-
tion that Section 1714.4 was the only reason for rejecting risk/
benefit claims:
21 The Maryland long-arm statute states:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an
agent... [clauses tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or
omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any
other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from
goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103(b) (Michie 2002).
22 See cases cited supra notes 8, 14.
23 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 129-30 (Cal. 2001) (alteration in original).
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Because the Legislature, in section 1714.4, has precluded a
weighing of the risks and benefits of selling a firearm to the gen-
eral public in determining whether the firearm is defective, we
conclude that neither a court nor a jury may undertake this
same task simply because a plaintiff alleges and offers evidence
the manufacturer knew or should have known the risks out-
weighed the benefits.24
Should other grounds exist under California law, one would
expect the Court to have mentioned them at some point in its four-
teen-page opinion, in order to prevent unnecessary litigation in
the event that section 1714.4 would one day be repealed.25
California courts will now be forced to either devise other
grounds for rejection, despite the conspicuous lack of guidance
from the Merrill opinion (or any other binding California prece-
dent),2" or to accommodate an imminent barrage of risk/benefit
lawsuits.
D. Future Scenarios for Gun Manufacturer Lawsuits in
California
1. The New York Approach
Under New York product liability law, a product is defective
when it is sold in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the
ultimate consumer,27 and when its utility is outweighed by the
danger inherent in placing it into the stream of commerce.28 In a
recent case involving a suit against manufacturers of "hollow-
point" ammunition, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in McCarthy v. Olin Corp.29 (applying New York
common law) declared that a product which performs its intended
function-in the case of guns or ammunition, to seriously
wound-simply cannot be described as defectively designed."
This is the doctrinal trap that the Merrill plaintiffs sought to
24 Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
25 The Ninth Circuit and the California Court of Appeal have each stated that absent
the statutory bar imposed by Section 1714.4, risk/benefit claims would nonetheless be pre-
cluded by existing common law. Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir.
1986); Whitfield v. Heckler & Koch, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 820, 829-30 (Ct. App. 2000). The
Supreme Court was presumably aware of these opinions (both predating Merrill), yet de-
clined to follow a similar tack.
26 See cases cited supra note 3. A possible exception is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Moore. In Moore, the Ninth Circuit held that a handgun that performs as "intended" can-
not be found to be defective under California products liability common law. Moore, 789
F.2d at 1327. It is noteworthy that Moore is not cited in the California Supreme Court's
Merrill opinion.
27 Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y.
1980).
28 Id.
29 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
30 Id. at 155 (holding that "the primary function of the Black Talon bullets [used by
"tong Island Railroad Killer" Colin Ferguson] was to kill or cause serious injury").
[Vol. 6:279
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avoid by couching their claim in terms of negligence. 1 Under a
"negligent distribution" approach, the claim is directed toward the
defendant's conduct in making a non-defective, yet potentially
harmful product available to a market that would likely misuse
it. 32 The California Supreme Court, however, held that this claim
was merely a product liability defect claim "in disguise" and that
the focus remained on the product, not the defendants' conduct,
despite the allegation being framed in terms of negligence.
If California courts, post-repeal, continue to hold that a negli-
gent distribution claim is simply a disguised design defect claim,
such a claim would face a sturdy barrier should the courts ignore
the implications of the Merrill holding and choose instead to fol-
low the New York approach of refusing to find a defect in a prod-
uct that performs its intended function.
2. California's Two-Part Barker Test as Applied to
Firearms
a. Consumer Expectation and Safer Alternative Design
The New York approach is similar to the disjunctive two-part
Barker test used in California,34 which states that a product is de-
fectively designed if it "fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner" (the "consumer expectation" test), or if the
benefits of the design are outweighed by the risk of inherent dan-
ger (the "risk/benefit" test). 5 The consumer expectation test has
yet to be considered by the California Supreme Court in relation
to gun manufacturers. 36  The plaintiffs in Merrill expressly
avoided application of the consumer expectation test, apparently
in an attempt to keep the focus of their claim on the defendant's
conduct and away from defects generally. 7
Although a consumer expectation defect claim was not ex-
pressly barred by Section 1714.4,38 such a claim would likely have
been futile, especially in light of the persuasive weight of the Sec-
31 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 126 (noting that "contrary to the view of
plaintiffs and the dissent," they could not avoid § 1714.4, "simply by reformulating their
claim as one for negligent distribution to the general public").
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978).
35 Id.
36 But see Whitfield v. Heckler & Koch, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 820, 829 (Ct. App. 2000)
(describing the defendant-manufacturer's HK .308 assault weapon as a non-defective "well-
made gun").
37 Merrill, 28 P.3d at 124.
38 The Statute excludes "a products liability cause of action based upon the improper




ond Circuit's decision in McCarthy.9 Post-repeal, the outlook for
consumer expectation claims in California remains grim.
California courts, like those in New York, require that when
using the consumer expectation test, a plaintiff show the availa-
bility of a feasible alternative design that would accomplish the
purpose of the product in a safe manner.4 ° In the context of fire-
arms, this requirement raises a logical hurdle: What safer way is
there to design a product intended to maim and kill? (Assuming,
as courts have, that guns are intended for that purpose.) Despite
the New York courts' reference to a product's "function,"41 and the
California courts' reference to "use" or "purpose,"42 neither juris-
diction has attempted to form any semantic distinction between
the various terms. Although such a distinction might seem crucial
to an assessment of the validity of alternative designs, courts in
both jurisdictions have looked solely at the product's ability to per-
form its basic mechanical function.43
Justice Calabresi, dissenting in McCarthy,' suggested that a
safer alternative design for Black Talon bullets would be to re-
move the talons,45 thereby removing the product's propensity to
cause massive internal damage while retaining its ability to inca-
pacitate a human target.46 Although Justice Calabresi rejected
the notion that a weapon's function is to cause the maximum
amount of bodily injury," he did not consider that the broader in-
tended purpose of many weapons is to provide a reliable means of
self-defense.
39 119 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997).
4o Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1976); Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983).
41 See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155.
42 See, e.g., Baker, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
43 See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155 ("[Tlhe primary function of... Black Talon
bullets was to kill or cause serious injury. There is no reason to search for an alternative
safer design where the product's sole utility is to kill and maim."); Moore v. R.G. Indus.,
Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (criminally used handgun "performed as it was
intended"). But cf Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (prescription
drug's intended purpose was to prevent miscarriage); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d
229, 236 (Cal. 1970) (heavy machinery that could not be safely reversed without additional
mirrors was "unreasonably dangerous for its intended use"). The distinction between func-
tion and purpose is not always an easy one. Consider a high-fashion shoe equipped with a
large metal spike protruding from the toe. It may perform its function by clothing the foot,
but if its purpose is to facilitate comfortable walking, it may fail miserably. Such a shoe
might also pose a threat to third parties if it were to become popular amongst violent
youths as a foot-borne weapon. As long as California courts continue to confuse purpose
with function, any potential harm to the consumer or others would not render the product
defective, no matter how foreseeable the harm, as long as the shoe effectively performs its
intrinsic function of clothing the foot.
44 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 157 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 173. The "talons" are six spikes on a bullet that extend 90 degrees upon
impact. Id. at 152.
46 Id. at 152 (giving a graphic description of the Black Talons' effects).
47 Id. at 173 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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The most effective weapon for the task of self-defense would
seem to be a weapon capable of concealment, portability, and le-
thality.4" It is quite likely, however, that it is exactly these quali-
ties of guns that contribute to their collective negative effect on
public health. Thus, the distinction between function and purpose
becomes significant when one considers the contribution that the
lethality of guns sold and purchased for the intended purpose of
self-defense makes to the number of homicides and suicides in the
United States.49 When effective achievement of an intended use
or purpose is looked at in this light, the better a gun performs its
function of propelling bullets with lethal speed and accuracy; the
less it achieves its intended purpose of providing a reliable means
of preserving human lives. One commentator has suggested that
a safer alternative design for a gun intended for self-defense
would be one whereby the gun delivers a non-lethal, yet fully inca-
pacitating stun.5 ° Whether or not such a design is technically fea-
sible, a simpler and even more radical alternative design is readily
available to gun manufacturers-a gun that can only fire blanks.
When one considers that for every time a gun is used to justifiably
kill an assailant, a gun is used in over forty non-legitimate kill-
ings,51 then a gun that fires only blanks would easily contribute
more toward the goal of life preservation than one that fires tradi-
tional live ammunition. The problem with these examples is that
they attempt to propose the next best thing to no gun at all, while
at the same time proposing something that can still (barely) be
described as a gun and thus meet the requirement of alleging that
a feasible safer design exists. Such a problem would not arise
were the purpose of guns not the complete opposite of their effect.
48 Forty-six percent of gun owners (and three-quarters of those owning only a hand-
gun) surveyed in 1994 possessed a gun primarily for protection against crime. Philip J.
Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use of
Firearms, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief, at 3
(May 1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.orgpdffiles/165476.pdf.
49 See About Four in Ten Americans Report Owning a Gun, The Gallup Organization
(Oct. 5, 2000), available at http'//www.gallup.com/poll/releases/prOO1005.asp [hereinafter
Gallup Poll] (reporting that thirty-nine percent of Americans surveyed believed that having
a gun in the house makes their home safer). However, the reality is somewhat different.
See Arthur L. Kellermann, Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 45 J. OF
TRAUmA 263, 263-67 (August, 1998) ("The number of unintentional shootings, criminal as-
saults, and suicide attempts involving a gun kept in the home exceeded the number of self-
defense and legally justifiable shootings by a ratio of 22 to 1."); Arthur L. Kellermann et al.,
Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329 N. ENG. J. MED. 1084,
1087-88 (1993) (stating that a gun in the home substantially increases the likelihood of
intra-familial homicide).
50 Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1353, 1377
(2000).
51 See Firearm Violence in California: Fact Sheet, Physicians for Social Responsibility
Los Angeles, available at http://www.psrla.org/FS-California.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2003) [hereinafter California Fact Sheet] (citing California Department of Health Services,
2002) (2000 figures for California).
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The likelihood that California courts will avoid the conceptual
conundrum of function versus purpose by refusing to extend the
definition of a gun's purpose beyond firing live ammunition need
not render a defect claim futile. Under California law, a product
liability claim may proceed on a risk/benefit theory alone.2
b. Risk/Benefit
Under risk/benefit prong of the Barker test, a product is defec-
tively designed if the benefits of its design are outweighed by the
risk of inherent danger, even when the product's design meets or-
dinary consumer expectations.53 The California risk/benefit test
differs from the New York test in that there is no requirement in
California that the plaintiff show there is "something wrong" with
the product before proceeding with a risk/benefit challenge.54 The
plaintiffs in Merrill might well have succeeded under California
law with a risk/benefit product defect claim, but they were forced
by the "products liability" limitation of Section 1714.4 to direct
their claim toward the defendants' conduct and to characterize it
as one of negligent distribution.5
3. Negligence as Applied to the Manufacture and Sale of
Firearms
a. Negligent Entrustment
Justice Werdegar, the lone dissenter in Merrill, noted that the
plaintiffs' negligent distribution claim closely resembled the more
traditional doctrine of negligent entrustment. 6 Typically, a claim
for negligent entrustment lies when a defendant sells, or other-
wise transfers, a non-defective product or instrumentality to a
person who could reasonably be foreseen to use that item in a
harmful manner. 7 In the context of gun sales, this doctrine has
been applied to sales to discernibly drunk or psychotic custom-
ers." Negligent entrustment has also been applied to sales of a
product to entire classes of customers, such as selling slingshots to
52 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978).
53 Id.; Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 148 (Ct. App. 1979).
54 See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Addison v.
Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 224 (La. Ct. App. 1989)).
55 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124 (Cal. 2001).
56 Id. at 134 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
57 See Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 486 (Ct. App. 1992).
5s See, e.g., Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 1532, 1539 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(holding there is a duty not to sell to a mentally defective person); Cullum & Boren-McCain
Mall, Inc. v. Peacock, 592 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ark. 1980) (holding there was sufficient evi-
dence for a negligence claim where a buyer acted strangely and wanted a gun that "would
make a big hole"); Phillips v. Roy, 431 So. 2d 849, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding there is a
duty not to sell to a person "manifesting signs of instability"); Bernethy v. Walt Failor's,
Inc., 653 P.2d 280, 283 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (holding there is a duty not to sell to an
intoxicated person).
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children. 9 Justice Werdegar suggested that the entire gun-buy-
ing public would be a patently unfit customer class for certain
types of firearms." This analysis is very similar to the Merrill
plaintiffs' characterization of their negligent distribution claim,
except that it directs the focus even further away from the prod-
uct's inherent danger, and more toward the relationship between
the seller's conduct and the ultimate use of the product by the con-
sumer. Such a claim, if framed carefully, might succeed before a
California court, if only for selected classes of guns.
b. Risk/Benefit in Negligence
In the wake of section 1714.4's repeal, the distinction between
a strict liability product defect claim and a negligence claim is
largely moot. California, like many other states, incorporates its
own version of the well-known "Hand Formula"6' into its test for a
duty in negligence.2 This test weighs the risk of harm, or more
accurately, the likelihood of harm multiplied by the severity of the
harm, against the burden of preventing the harm. This balanc-
ing test differs from the risk/benefit test used in product liability
defect cases only in that the potential harm (or cost of compensa-
tion) is weighed against the cost of prevention of harm, rather
than the value to society of the harmful product or activity. The
similarity of the evidentiary requirements of both tests was noted
in the Merrill opinion and used to bolster the Court's holding that
a negligence claim necessarily employs risk/benefit analysis.'
4. Weighing Risk of Guns Versus Benefit of Guns
Whether or not a claim is framed in negligence or in strict
product liability, the risk/benefit analysis is essentially the same;
if the benefit of a product to society is outweighed by the risk of
harm to society, then the product is defectively designed (or, in the
case of negligent distribution, the product has been negligently
placed on the market). 5 Measuring risk versus benefit is seem-
ingly straightforward in the context of firearms. If it were a mat-
59 See Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 769-70 (Mich. 1977) (holding that that the
manufacturer and distributor of a slingshot could be held negligent for marketing a sling-
shot directly to children). But see Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484
(Ct. App. 1976) (holding that there was no duty to refrain from selling slingshots to chil-
dren, as the use of slingshots by children had been socially acceptable "since Old Testament
times").
60 Merrill, 28 P.3d at 149 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
61 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The "Hand
Formula" is named after the author of the Carroll Towing opinion, Justice Learned Hand.
62 See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 232 (Cal. 1970).
63 See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
64 Merrill, 28 P.3d at 125.
65 See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978); Pike, 467 P.2d at
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ter of counting the number of lives saved by guns and comparing
that to the number of unjustifiable deaths involving guns, then as
a product class, guns would almost certainly fail the risk/benefit
test.66
While it is tempting to stay with a lives saved versus deaths
caused tally, the application of the risk/benefit test to firearms is,
in actuality, somewhat more complex and harder to measure. For
example, much of the self-defense benefit derived from gun owner-
ship might arise from the mere possession of guns, as opposed to
their actual discharge during a confrontation. One recent study
conducted by Professors John Lott and David Mustard ("Lott/Mus-
tard study") has suggested that the prevalence of gun ownership-
and the accompanying likelihood that a potential crime victim
may possess a gun-deters a significant amount of potentially vio-
lent confrontations.67 Because the study's conclusion relies on ab-
stract, unrealized benefits-i.e., the potential reduction in crime
through increased defensive gun use, it is unlikely that it would
fare well in a statistical duel against stark figures of deaths actu-
ally caused by guns."5
Despite the repeated disavowal by federal courts of a Second
Amendment right to personal gun ownership,69 California courts
may still be loath to inhibit what many citizens nonetheless per-
ceive to be a fundamental constitutional right.7" The deeply in-
grained feeling of communal empowerment among American gun
owners might then provide another, albeit unquantifiable, factor
to add to the benefit side of the formula.71
A trial based on litigation of risk versus benefit as factual is-
sues would ultimately turn on the strength of statistical evidence.
The few reported justifiable lethal uses of guns,7' together with
unreported uses of guns in self-defense and the academic guess-
66 There were seventy-three justified gun-related killings versus 3,019 gun-related
suicides, homicides, and unintentional deaths in California during 2000. California Fact
Sheet, supra note 51.
67 John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Con-
cealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997).
68 According to some critics in academia, another weakness of the Lott/Mustard study
might be its flawed methodology. See, e.g., Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-
Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 209 (1998).
69 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution does not guarantee an individual
right to possess firearms); Olympic Arms v. Buckles, 301 F.3d 384, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to recognize a fundamental right to individual gun ownership or manufacture).
70 In a 2002 ABCNEWS.com poll, seventy-three percent of respondents who heard the
Second Amendment recited verbatim said it guarantees the right to individual gun owner-
ship. Daniel Merkle, America: It's Our Right to Bear Arms, ABCNEWS.com (May 14,
2002), at http://abcnews.go.com/sectionslus/DailyNews/guns-pol020514.html [hereinafter
ABCNEWS.com poll].
71 Thirty-nine percent of Americans surveyed in 2000 believed that having a gun in
the house made the house safer. See Gallup Poll, supra note 49.
72 See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
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work of the Lott/Mustard study,73 would be pitted against copious,
reliable evidence showing the huge volume of homicides, suicides,
injuries, and accidental deaths attributable to the misuse of le-
gally purchased firearms.74
The availability of other weapons (such as knives) to potential
assailants necessitates a downward adjustment of gross firearm
casualty figures to allow for those deaths and injuries that would
still have occurred absent an available gun.7" Assuming that
knives are second in lethality to guns, and that they have a lethal-
ity rate approximately one fifth that of guns (not allowing for
physical disparities between assailants and victims-a factor
largely irrelevant to guns),76 the annual homicide toll in California
attributable to guns can be reduced to a net figure of 1,182,
around eighty percent of the 1,478 gross reported gun-related
homicides. 77 Therefore, the removal of guns would ultimately ap-
pear to prevent over 1,000 homicides annually in California.78
The Lott/Mustard study found that homicide rates fell by an
average of 8.5 percent in states that legalized concealed hand-
guns.79 From this, it follows that, in a state such as California,
which currently has strict concealed handgun laws, greater access
to guns in the community would reduce the total annual number
of homicides from 2,07480 to 1,898, and the number of firearm
homicides from 1,478 s1 to 1,352.82
The findings of the Lott/Mustard study were distilled into a
popular book entitled More Guns, Less Crime. Any truth in that
book's title is diminished by the statistical evidence that no guns
73 Lott & Mustard, supra note 67.
74 See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51. In 2000, firearms killed 3,092 people in
California. Of these deaths, 1,488 were suicides, 1,478 were homicides, 53 were uninten-
tional, and 73 were legally justified or undetermined. Id.
75 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
1103, 1114-15 (1991).
76 Id. (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
TASK FORCE, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 41 (1969)).
77 This reduction ignores the implausibility of drive-by knifings replacing drive-by
shootings.
78 The net amount of lives saved by removal of guns and the net amount of lives unjus-
tifiably lost to guns can both arguably be adjusted downward on the assumption that the
few annual justifiable gun killings would be replaced by an equivalent number of unjustifi-
able homicides if a gun were not available to perform each justifiable killing.
79 John R. Lott, Jr., Rule of Law: More Guns, Less Violent Crime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28,
1996, at A13. See also Lott & Mustard, supra note 67.
so This number is based on figures for 2000 from the Office of the Attorney General,
State of California, Department of Justice. California Crime Index Crimes Cleared,
1996-2001, Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Department of Justice,
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjscdpublications/candd/cdO1tabs/cdOll5.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2003).
81 California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
82 Assuming that an increase in concealed firearms would reduce all types of potential
homicides in equal proportion.
83 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).
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equals roughly six times less crime than more guns. 4 Professors
Lott and Mustard's argument is therefore not an argument in
favor of the use of guns, but an argument in mitigation of the
harm caused by guns.
Despite the speculative nature of calculating the amount of
suicides that would not occur absent a readily available firearm, a
study by the New England Journal of Medicine ("NEJM") deter-
mined that the presence of a gun in the home increased the risk of
suicide approximately fivefold.85 This finding supports the com-
mon-sense belief that because almost all non-gun suicide attempts
require a longer interval between inception of the suicidal notion
and completion of the act, removal of guns would reduce deaths by
facilitating greater opportunities for reconsideration by the poten-
tial victim and intervention by third parties. In 2000, there were
2,969 suicides reported in California. 6 In 1,488 of these, a firearm
was used. 7 Using the NEJM figures, the removal of guns from
Californian households would therefore reduce the number of gun-
related suicides by eighty percent, from 1,488 to 298, and the total
number of suicides from 2,969 to 1,779,88 leaving a net annual sui-
cide toll attributable to guns of 1,190.
In 2000, there were fifty-three deaths in California attributa-
ble to accidental or unintentional shootings. 9 Despite the Lott/
Mustard study's somewhat inexplicable finding that accidental
gun deaths were lower in jurisdictions with liberal concealed gun
laws,90 it is unreasonable to assume that the removal of guns
would do anything but completely eliminate deaths caused by ac-
cidental discharge of a gun.
Based on the above figures, the removal of guns from Califor-
nian society would prevent 2,425 unjustified deaths annually,91
while current levels of gun ownership in California would prevent
84 Specifically, six times less non-legitimate gun-related deaths (based on more guns
reducing gross annual homicide by 8.5 percent, and the removal of guns reducing gross
gun-related homicide by eighty percent). See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
85 Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership,
327 N. ENG. J. MED. 467, 470 (1992). It is unclear whether this study accounts for guns
purchased after the inception of the suicidal notion. The presence of those guns purchased
specifically for the purpose of committing suicide would contribute to the total number of
suicides only by increased lethality, not by ready availability. Another study found that as
few as ten percent of firearm suicides were committed using a firearm purchased specifi-
cally for the act. Myron Boor, Methods of Suicide and Implications for Suicide Prevention,
37 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 70, 74 (1981).
86 John L. McIntosh, Rate, Number, and Ranking of Suicide for Each U.S.A. State,
2000, American Association of Suicidology, available at http://www.suicidology.org/associa-
tions/1045/files/2000statepg.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
87 California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
8s See Kellermann et al., supra note 85, at 469.
89 California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
90 Lott & Mustard, supra note 67, at 64.
91 If the combined net total of homicides, suicides, and accidental deaths attributable
to guns is adjusted downward on the assumption that without guns, the seventy-three re-
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only seventy-three, 2 rising to 249 prevented deaths (according to
Professors Lott and Mustard) if concealed permit laws were
liberalized.93
One offset to the economic harm to society caused by guns is
based on the questionable observation that many homicide victims
are habitual criminals, and/or welfare recipients, and would be a
burden to society if they were to have continued living.94 Even if
this were true, it is likely that a jury would treat such evidence of
economic offset as morally repugnant.
As complex as the factual issues are when it comes to measur-
ing the risk versus the benefit of guns in society, a jury is ulti-
mately left with the task of measuring the massive death toll
attributable to firearms on the risk side, against the few reported
uses of guns in self-defense, the arguable deterrent effect of undis-
charged guns, and the unquantifiable worth of guns for recreation
on the benefit side.
Suits against gun manufacturers have largely been directed
at the misuse of guns and ammunition that have a higher than
average potential for lethality, for example, the Intratec TEC-9
semi-automatic "assault-type pistols,"95 "Black Talon bullets,"96
"Saturday night specials,"97 etc. If liability is to be based on risk/
benefit alone, the distinction is merely one of degree. While the
ratio of risk to benefit may vary considerably across the broad
spectrum of legally available firearms, it is unlikely that even the
most benign class of firearm could tip the risk/benefit scales in its
favor. Notwithstanding the Intratec TEC-9 and other excessively
lethal weaponry, many guns have at least some potential for legit-
imate use. But the fact remains that the potential for self-defense
is realized in minuscule proportion to the frequency of misuse, 9
leaving the overwhelming burden of outweighing the cost of
thousands of unjustified killings almost entirely upon recreational
use. The only realistic defenses to gun manufacturer suits in Cali-
ported justifiable gun deaths would have been replaced by an equivalent amount of unjusti-
fiable deaths, then 2,352 deaths would result. See supra note 78.
92 California Fact Sheet, supra note 51. This figure is based on the assumption that
the seventy-three reported justifiable gun deaths prevented an equivalent amount of unjus-
tifiable deaths.
93 Lott & Mustard, supra note 67.
94 JOSH SUGARMANN, EVERY HANDGUN is AIMED AT YOU 160-61 (2001). See also Paul
H. Blackman, The Federal Factoid Factory on Firearms and Violence: A Review of CDC
Research and Politics (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences, Chicago, Ill., March 1994), available at http://www.saf.org/journal/7_fac-
toid.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
95 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001).
96 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1997).
97 Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Kelley v. R.G. In-
dus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Md. 1985).
98 See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51. See also supra note 66.
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fornia, therefore, lie outside of risk/benefit analysis in the unpre-
dictable world of public policy.
E. Public Policy Against Gun Manufacturer Liability
1. Deference to the Legislature
The courts of more than one state have rejected the applica-
tion of risk/benefit analysis in gun cases in deference to legislative
judgment on the societal value of firearms, even when that judg-
ment is presumed from silence. 99 The notion that the absence of
prohibitive legislation supercedes a judicial determination of neg-
ative net social utility will always remain attractive to courts that
are unwilling to apply precedent that conflicts with a deeply in-
grained social acceptance of a product that is nonetheless patently
dangerous.
The California Legislature, however, has not been silent on
the issue of regulation of gun sales, whether by state courts or by
local governments. The Legislature has made its position clear by
an affirmative legislative action-the repeal of a statute expressly
prohibiting risk/benefit product liability actions against gun man-
ufacturers. 1 0 This in itself should be sufficient evidence that the
Legislature approves of civil suits against gun manufacturers
based on risk/benefit theories. Any attempt to replace Section
1714.4 with a statute expressly allowing risk/benefit suits against
gun manufacturers would be unnecessary, as those suits will pre-
sumably be treated the same as those against any other
manufacturer.
Furthermore, in California Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of West
Hollywood, °1 the California Court of Appeal held that statutes
governing licensing, permit issuance, and registration of guns
showed intent by the Legislature to regulate only those fields, and
not the field of gun sales. 10 2 Therefore, because the Legislature
has abdicated the role of regulating gun sales and limiting liabil-
ity of gun manufacturers, California courts are not only free to
decide the issue of gun manufacturers' liability without deference
to the Legislature, but are obligated to do so-even if it would in-
directly result in a de facto state-wide ban on gun sales.
99 See, e.g., Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (App. Div. 1996) ("While there have
been and will be countless debates over the issue of whether the risks of firearms outweigh
their benefits, it is for Legislature to decide whether manufacture, sale and possession of
firearms is legal.").
1oo S.B. 682, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (repealing CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.4).
O 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Ct. App. 1998).
102 Id. at 605.
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2. Assumption of Risk by the Market
The Washington Court of Appeal, in Knott v. Liberty Jewelry
& Loan, Inc., °3 held that gun manufacturers could not be held lia-
ble when the general public "presumably can recognize the dan-
gerous consequences in the use of handguns and can assume
responsibility for their actions."104 This policy-based imposition of
an assumption of risk defense ignores the fact that most plaintiffs
seeking redress for gun-related injuries are not consumers. This
begs the question: For what actions should these victims take
responsibility?
3. Criminal Intervention Abrogates Duty
It is unlikely that California courts will consider criminal mis-
use to be an intervening act that abrogates the duty of a gun man-
ufacturer to avoid distribution to a class of customers, most of
whom show no signs of intent to misuse the product. Typically, a
defendant has no duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff by a third
party absent a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the
defendant. °5 But in the case of gun manufacture and distribu-
tion, it is not nonfeasance, but active misfeasance-the distribu-
tion of a product to a class of consumer that collectively carries a
substantial risk of criminal misuse-that creates the risk of dan-
ger to the plaintiff.10 Thus, the link between the plaintiff's inju-
ries and the defendant's affirmative conduct remains unbroken by
foreseeable criminal misuse. The weight and availability of statis-
tical evidence showing the volume of crimes (and other misuse)
committed using legally purchased guns'017 easily refutes any
claim by a manufacturer-defendant that such acts by a consumer
(or foreseeable transferee) are unforeseeable. In fact, any seller of
firearms having a basic familiarity with the relevant statistics
should know that every gun he sells has a roughly 1 in 160 chance
of being used in the commission of an unjustified killing.'
103 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
1o4 Id. at 664 (quoting Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985)).
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 315 states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id.
106 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 143 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
107 See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
1O8 No figures are available for the amount of guns currently in circulation in Califor-
nia. A somewhat reliable estimate can be made, however, based on an extensive national
survey conducted in 1994, which found that approximately 192 million guns were in circu-
lation nationwide at that time. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 48, at 1. In 1994, there were
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III. THE PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF FIREARM SALES
A. The Economic Effect on the Industry
If California courts were to allow risk/benefit lawsuits against
gun manufacturers, the flood of litigation might well be brief,
when one considers how many lawsuits the gun industry can af-
ford to lose. In 2000, over three thousand lives were lost in Cali-
fornia as a result of non-legitimate gun use.' °9 Under the
California long-arm statute, 110 and constitutional personal juris-
diction jurisprudence,"' victims of gun violence in California may
sue in California, under California law, no matter where the gun
was manufactured or sold," 2 provided that the gun manufacturer
38,505 firearm deaths nationwide. WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1981-1998, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Con-
trol, available at http-//webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipclmortrate9.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2003).
Assuming that the ratio of guns to deaths is the same for California in 2000 as it was
for the nation in 1994 (i.e., guns in California today carry the same risk as guns across the
nation did in 1994), then a figure of approximately fifteen million guns in circulation in
California in 2000 can be derived from the 3,092 gross firearm deaths reported for that
year. California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
During the period from 1991 to 2000, an average of 465,375 guns were sold annually in
California. Dealer's Record of Sale, supra note 4. Assuming that annual sales, as well as
the total amount of guns in circulation, have remained fairly steady over time, the useful
life of a gun can be estimated at roughly thirty-nine years.
The chance of any one gun in California causing an unjustified killing during one year
can therefore be calculated by dividing the fifteen million guns in circulation by the net
annual non-legitimate gun deaths-2,425 for the year 2000. California Fact Sheet, supra
note 51. The chance of killing in one particular year-1 in 6,186-increases to a chance of
approximately 1 in 160 of the gun being used to cause a non-legitimate killing at any time
during a thirty-nine-year useful life.
One manufacturer has admitted to being well-informed of the likelihood of misuse,
while at the same time denying any responsibility. Carlos Garcia, owner of Navegar, Inc.,
the manufacturer of the Intratec TEC-9, is quoted in the California Supreme Court's Mer-
rill opinion as saying: "I know some of the guns going out of here end up killing people, but
I'm not responsible for that." Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 138 (Cal. 2001) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting).
log The exact number of lives lost was 3,092 (1,488 were suicides, 1,478 were homi-
cides, and 53 were accidental). California Fact Sheet, supra note 51. When adjusted down-
ward for causation, the net total is approximately 2,352. See supra Part II.D.5.
11o CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2003). See also Benefit Ass'n
Int'l, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[Ilf a foreign corpo-
ration purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it
may subject itself to the State's in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence
in the State.") (quoting Southeastern Express Sys. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216,
219 (1995)) (alteration and emphasis in original).
11i See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
112 When the gun was manufactured or sold may be controversial. Following the 1998
repeal of Civil Code Section 1714.45 granting tort immunity to tobacco manufacturers, the
California Supreme Court held that immunity did not extend to conduct occurring prior to
the enactment of the statute. See Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d 769, 775
(Cal. 2002); Myers v. Philip Morris Cos., 50 P.3d 751, 763 (Cal. 2002).
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or retailer regularly conducts business in California."' Because
all major American gun manufacturers (as well as some foreign
manufacturers) regularly conduct business in California,"4 the
only way for a manufacturer to avoid liability for injuries in Cali-
fornia would be to either cease selling firearms to the public na-
tionally, or to withdraw from all commercial contact with the
state.
The economic cost of gun-related deaths and injuries in Cali-
fornia has been estimated at over $300 million annually."5 Even
when this figure is adjusted to account for those deaths and inju-
ries that would have occurred if the assailant (or suicide victim)
had not had access to a gun,"' the financial burden if transferred
to the gun industry would add over $100 to the price of every gun
sold in California," 7 or if applied to nationwide gun sales, $6 to
every gun sold." 8  This calculation assumes that the dollar
amount of jury verdicts would be equivalent to the cost of victims'
medical care alone, and that the volume of gun sales would re-
main steady, despite the increased cost of liability being passed on
to the consumer. The reality for gun manufacturers would likely
be far bleaker.
B. Risk/Benefit Liability as a Restraint on the Right to
Contract
Such a devastating, and possibly fatal, assault on the gun in-
dustry might be seen by some as an unjustifiable restraint on the
ability of merchants and consumers to enter into lawful contracts.
A prominent critic of the risk/benefit strict product liability doc-
trine, Professor Richard Epstein, has called for the abolition of
risk/benefit analysis on the grounds that it is not only an infringe-
ment on the right to contract, but it is also inefficient, arbitrary,
113 It is under this principle that the plaintiffs in Merrill were able to sue a defendant
corporation based in Florida for injuries arising in California from a firearm sold in
Nevada.
114 "Weapons from nearly 650 manufacturers were sold in California - but just 20
companies accounted for 83.8 percent of all sales. Eleven of these companies are based in
the United States, including three from California. Imports accounted for about 40 percent
of medium- and large-caliber guns." Calif Handgun Study to Fortify Crime Prevention
Effort, Newswise (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.newswise.com/articles/2002/9/
I-ANDGUNS.UCM.html.
115 Firearm-Related Violence: Costs, Pacific Center for Violence Prevention (Dec. 6,
1996), available at http://www.pcvp.orglpcvp/firearms/facts/guncost2.shtml.
116 See supra Part II.D.5.
117 This amount is based on annual sales in 2000 of 386,210 units. See Dealer's Record
of Sale, supra note 4.
118 This amount is based on annual manufacture and importation of 4.7 million guns.
Garen J. Wintemute, Where the Guns Come From: The Gun Industry and Gun Commerce,




and unnecessary." 9 Professor Epstein's view is that unless a
product is defectively manufactured, i.e., prone to malfunction, or
unless its dangerous propensity is misrepresented to the con-
sumer, then the market should decide its fate.120 Thus, the con-
sumer is free to either assume the known risk of danger inherent
in the product, or to boycott the product. This argument might
work for cigarettes-as long as secondhand smoke injuries can be
reduced without an adverse impact on the market-and for many
other dangerous products, but in the case of firearms, it is unrea-
sonable, if not morally indefensible, to suggest that the economic
"right" of the consumer and merchant to enter into a consensual
bargain outweighs the threat of harm to non-consumers.
Gun advocates have compared the risk/benefit analysis of gun
sales to other popular products that present an inherent risk of
danger, such as cars, swimming pools, bathtubs, aspirin, and even
household kitchen products. 2 ' Most of these products, however,
have unique and widespread social utility that cannot be more
safely derived through feasible alternative means. The social util-
ity of guns is limited to self-defense and recreation. Self-defense
has been proven to be a largely illusory function of guns,'22 and the
recreational value of guns, while unique, is limited to relatively
few consumers 123 and has little value to society as a whole.
The fundamental question is who should bear the cost to soci-
ety of a consensual, legal transaction between two parties?
Should it be society at large? Or should it be the parties to the
transaction? The threat that internalizing the cost of the transac-
tion poses to the viability of the transaction itself is not a justifia-
ble reason for the parties to the transaction to pass the cost on to
the largely gunless general population, simply to preserve a right
to conduct a lawful business.
The libertarian mantra of individual responsibility cannot be
used to justify sales of a legal product if the seller and purchaser-
both of whom reap the benefit of the transaction-remain unwill-
ing to accept the responsibility of compensating those who are not
119 Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2193, 2202-03 (1989) [hereinafter Epstein, The Unintended Revolution]; Rich-
ard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 474-77 (1987) [hereinafter
Epstein, The Risks of Risk / Utility].
120 See generally Epstein, The Unintended Revolution, supra note 119.
121 See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, Talking Points: Facts About Guns, Libertarian Party
News Online (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.lp.org/lpnews/0209/talkingpoints2.html;
Karen Selick, The Legitimate Uses of Firearms (Jan. 1995), available at http://www.karen-
selick.comICL9501.html.
122 In 2000, only 73 gun deaths were reported as the result of legally justified interven-
tion or undetermined intent. See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
123 "[A]bout 35 percent of gun owners (15 million people, 8 percent of the adult public)
hunted in 1994, and about an equal percentage engaged in sport shooting other than hunt-
ing." Cook & Ludwig, supra note 48, at 2-3.
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a party to the transaction but who are inevitably and foreseeably
harmed by it. If those likely to be injured by a product were pri-
marily the consumers, then it would be logically and morally
sound to allow consumers the right to decide for themselves
whether the benefits of the purchase outweigh the risks. Califor-
nia courts, however, have long held that as long as that decision
puts non-consumers at risk, the cost of injuries to non-consumers
must be "borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves."124
Professor Epstein's argument for consumers deciding safety is
particularly problematic when applied to sales of firearms. On the
one hand, he argues that liability should attach when there is dif-
ferential knowledge at the time of purchase regarding the danger
posed by a product's use.12  On the other hand, he proposes that
the risk of harm posed by a product that is free of patent physical
defects should be gauged by common knowledge among the gen-
eral public or the consumers. 126
In the context of guns, "common knowledge" of the dangers of
firearms'27 differs substantially from the actual risk of harm as
known only to an informed few, including those who manufacture
guns and nonetheless represent them as a reliable means of self-
defense. 12  Not only is the gun manufacturers' knowledge of the
true risks superior to that of the consumers, it is also misrepre-
sented to the consumer. According to Professor Epstein, however,
neither of these facts matters, as it is the "common knowledge" of
consumers as a whole that should draw the line between danger-
ous and unreasonably dangerous products. 129
124 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962).
125 Epstein, The Risks of Risk/ Utility, supra note 119, at 474.
126 Epstein, The Unintended Revolution, supra note 119, at 2212. See also Cronin v. J.
B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d. 1153 (Cal. 1972). In Cronin, the California Supreme Court
appeared to adopt into California common law, as part of what would later become the
consumer expectation prong of two-part Barker test, the following language from comment
i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "[D]angerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the as
to its characteristics." Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). The court, however, rejected the "un-
reasonably dangerous" terminology of the Restatement as overreaching, at least insofar as
it relates to consumer expectation. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. i (1965)). But see Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309 n.5 (Cal. 1994)
("Barker ... strongly implies that the consumer expectations test does not apply when the
degree of safety a product should exhibit under particular circumstances is a matter be-
yond the common experience and understanding of its ordinary users.").
127 This is reflected by the number of Americans who purchase guns believing them to
provide a safe and effective means of self-defense. See Gallup Poll, supra note 49.
128 This differential knowledge is apparent from the frank testimony of Carlos Garcia,
owner of Navegar, Inc. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 138 (Cal. 2001) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting).
129 Epstein, The Unintended Revolution, supra note 119, at 2212.
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Professor Epstein argues that the only alternative to the ob-
jective "common knowledge" standard would be to use the subjec-
tive knowledge of each consumer-plaintiff on a case-by-case basis;
a standard that would be formless, uncertain, and generate exces-
sive litigation.3 ° In an effort to protect the merchant's right to
enter into what merely seems to be an evenly matched bargain,
Professor Epstein fails to consider the more reasonable alterna-
tive to either gauge of unreasonable dangerousness--actual risk
of harm.' 3' As a result of this deference to widespread ignorance
determining standards of safety, a seller or manufacturer would
never be held responsible for harm caused by misuse of a physi-
cally non-defective product by the consumer, whether to a third
party or the consumer, even when that harm is not just foresee-
able but inevitable.
C. The Effect on the Market
The idea that the market should regulate itself-rather than
be regulated by legislation or by tort liability-is simply not feasi-
ble in the context of firearms. A blanket ban would likely face
insurmountable voter resistance.'32 Legislative attempts to regu-
late firearm sales have so far been severely hindered by the im-
practicality of listing models or classes of banned firearms, 33 and
have been successful only in limiting access to a few excessively
lethal types of guns, 134 while leaving the rest readily available to
the general public. Thus, the market has been largely free, since
its inception, to regulate itself.
Whether or not the widespread belief among gun owners (and
many non-gun owners) that guns provide a reliable means of self-
defense 135 is the product of misrepresentation or ignorance, there
130 Id. at 2213.
131 See supra Part II.D.5.
132 Almost three-quarters of Americans believe that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees an individual right to bear arms. ABCNEWS.com poll, supra note 70.
133 For example, the Intratec TEC-DC9 was introduced to evade a District of Columbia
ban on its virtually indistinguishable predecessor, the TEC-9. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,
28 P.3d 116, 135 n.2 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting). See also Harrott v. County of
Kings, 25 P.3d 649, 653 (Cal. 2001) (discussing difficulty of identifying particular weapons
as banned by statute).
134 In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2000 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922
(2000 & Supp. 2003)). The Act banned the manufacture, sale, and possession of nineteen
types of assault weapons, as well as others with certain characteristics. In California, the
State Legislature enacted the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989, prohibit-
ing the advertising, manufacture, sale, and possession of certain assault weapons in Cali-
fornia. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275.5, 12276 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003). As of 2002, the
following six states have some kind of statewide assault weapon ban: Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. The Assault Weapons Ban: Ques-
tions & Answers, Brady Center (Aug. 2002), available at http'//www.bradycampaign.org/
facts/gunlaws/awb.asp.
135 See Gallup Poll, supra note 49.
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remains a large portion of the public that is willing to continue
purchasing a product that has been proven to put themselves and
others at considerable risk of harm. As long as potential consum-
ers perceive no risk to themselves, the market will not diminish
absent external regulation.
If regulation by jury were to drive the gun market out of Cali-
fornia, 136 Californians would still be able to legally buy guns in
many other states. The gun industry might survive, but Californi-
ans' ability to purchase guns would be severely hindered. It could
be argued that while gun ownership among law-abiding citizens in
California would decline, ownership among the criminal popula-
tion-most of whom would rather buy a gun illegally in California
than travel out of state-would not. This point is succinctly made
by a popular bumper sticker which declares, "If guns are out-
lawed, only outlaws will have guns."'37
This argument assumes that the elimination of the legal gun
market in California would not ultimately reduce the amount of
guns available on the black market in California, and also that a
significant portion of homicides are committed by people who
would be willing to purchase a gun on the street. Studies have
shown, however, that relatively few homicides (which, in them-
selves, comprise a minority of all non-legitimate gun deaths) are
committed by "criminals" and that the large majority of homicides
are committed by "law-abiding citizens"-usually against a family
member.13 Also, it would be inapposite to characterize the 1,190
annual suicides in California attributable to guns 139 as committed
by "criminals." Therefore, even if guns remain in the hands of
criminals, and even if there are less guns available for self-de-
fense, as long as a substantial portion of "law-abiding citizens" are
136 Justice Werdegar, dissenting in Merrill, addressed the likelihood and propriety of a
de facto ban by jury as follows:
[A] jury's finding in a product defect action that a particular product is defective
because the risks of injury arising from the design outweigh the design's benefits
does not "ban" the product. While bearing strict liability for injuries arising from
such a product, the defendant in such a case may legally continue to produce and
distribute it. And even when such decisions will, in the long run, effectively drive
a product from the market, California courts and juries are empowered to make
them.
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 147 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
137 Available for sale at http://www.campingsurvival.com/bumsticandwa.html. For a
sardonic commentary on the inherent irony of this message (and other pro-gun bumper
sticker assertions) see Norman Townsend, Understanding the Redneck Point of View, FC
Bytes, at http:J/www.fc.peachnet.edu/webzine/backbytes/featuresl0/redneck.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2003).
138 See Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, Protection or Peril?: An Analysis of
Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1557-60 (1986) (discussing
a study of 743 firearm deaths reported over a 6-year period in King County, Washington).
139 See California Fact Sheet, supra note 51. This is a net figure adjusted downward
for causation. See also supra Part II.D.5.
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deterred from purchasing guns by a statewide sales ban, there
would still be a substantial net gain in lives saved.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the absence of any statutory immunity for gun manufac-
turers, California courts will certainly have to allow some risk/
benefit lawsuits for injuries resulting from the misuse of firearms.
Whether the repeal invites a flood or a trickle, the factual issue of
risks versus benefits should be quick and easy to resolve. Far
from being left with "neither rule nor compass to guide [them],"4°
juries will merely have to decide how many deaths would be an
acceptable price to pay for the recreational value of guns. At the
very least, assault-type weapons like the Intratec TEC-9, as a
class, would fail this test. 4' It is even possible that juries may
find, as an issue of fact, that any gun fails the test. Whether such
a result would force the demise of the American gun industry re-
mains to be seen.
The imposition of tort liability upon manufacturers is not a
betrayal of the traditional role of tort law as primarily compensa-
tory. It has long been the role of juries to determine the societal
value of private conduct by weighing the risks and benefits of that
conduct-whether in terms of negligence or strict product liabil-
ity. That the sale of guns has defied effective statutory and self-
regulation only emphasizes the need for juries to play a decisive
role in the regulation of gun sales, as well as providing a means of
compensation to injured plaintiffs.
In California, it can no longer be claimed that the majority of
the electorate-including those who do not own guns-tacitly
share responsibility for the cost of widespread gun ownership in
the state. It might be true that the failure of the Legislature to
enact a law banning all civilian gun possession fairly represents
the will of the people to permit continued gun ownership, but that
does not mean that the people of California are willing to continue
sharing the financial burden imposed on the state and its citizens
as a result of gun sales to California residents and visitors.
The people of California have stated, through the repeal of
Civil Code Section 1714.4, that the right to buy and sell guns may
be regulated by the imposition of costs incurred from foreseeable
misuse of the guns upon those who benefit the most from the
140 Epstein, The Unintended Revolution, supra note 119, at 2211.
141 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1999). The
California Court of Appeal quoted the declaration of expert witness, Police Chief Supenski,
in which he stated that the Intratec TEC-DC9 is "completely useless" for hunting, is never
used by competitive or recreational shooters, "has no legitimate sporting use," has no prac-
tical value for self-defense due to its weight, inaccuracy and firepower, and is instead de-
signed to engage multiple targets during rapid sustained fire. Id.
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transaction. All that remains is for the California courts to follow
the command of legislative action and legal precedent, and allow
juries to determine whether the survival of the gun industry is
worth the annual sacrifice of thousands of Californians.
